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ike changes to Social Security at the federal level, changes to the 
Oregon Public Employee Retirement System (PERS) have been 
the untouchable “third rail” of state politics. With more than $68 
billion in assets1 and providing retirement benefits to more than three 
hundred thousand state employees,2 PERS has been a far-reaching 
and politically charged topic for decades. Unfortunately, because 
employee benefits have outgrown contributions in recent years, 
PERS’s total unfunded liability has grown to more than $21 billion3 
and made it the most pressing issue facing Oregon’s legislators as 
they work to set the state budget. 
Because both local and state agencies contribute to PERS, it has a 
far-reaching fiscal impact in Oregon. Presently, government agencies 
(state and local) will be responsible for contributing an additional 
$885 million to the PERS system during the 2017–2019 biennium, a 
forty-four percent increase from the 2015–2017 biennium!4 This 
makes PERS one of the larger cost drivers contributing to Oregon’s 
budget deficit5 and, like Social Security, this problem will only grow 
as more baby boomers retire. 
 
1 2015 PERS Fund Earnings Fall Short of Assumed Rate, PERSPECTIVES FOR OPSRP 
MEMBERS, (Or. Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys., Tigard Or.), Apr. 2016, at 1, https://www.oregon.gov 
/pers/MEM/OPSRP/Documents/Perspectives/opsrp_perspectives_4-1-16.pdf. 
2 OR. PUB. EMPS. RET. SYS., PERS: BY THE NUMBERS 2 (2017), http://www.oregon 
.gov/PERS/Documents/General-Information/PERS-by-the-Numbers.pdf. 
3 Editorial, Oregon Swallowed by PERS Costs, REG. GUARD, Aug. 27, 2017, at G2. 
4 Ted Sickinger, PERS: Oregon’s Public Pension Costs Will Go Up $885M Next Year, 
OREGONIAN (July 30, 2016, 3:21 PM), https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf 
/2016/07/pers_oregons_public_pension_co.html. 
5 Mike Rogoway, Oregon’s Economy Soars yet State Budget Gap Grows: Here’s Why, 
OREGONIAN (Apr. 9, 2017, 5:13 PM), https://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf 
/2017/04/oregons_economy_soars_yet_stat.html. 
L
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Many argue that changes to PERS are necessary to maintain the 
financial solvency of Oregon. However, changes to PERS face huge 
political opposition from public employee unions, as well as 
challenges in the courts. As Governor Kate Brown said in a 2016 
gubernatorial debate, “When I hear [PERS reform proposals], I hear 
lawsuit, lawsuit, lawsuit . . . .”6 
This Comment helps to frame the history and public policy issues 
surrounding PERS in Oregon. To be explicit, this is not a political or 
advocacy piece focused on any specific future changes. Instead, this 
piece aims to identify how Oregon reached this point with PERS and 
analyze the Oregon Supreme Court’s rationale in deciding the most 
recent PERS case: Moro v. State.7 Part I discusses the history and 
background of PERS, including prior reforms to the program and 
subsequent legal challenges that preceded Moro v. State. Part II 
examines the changes to PERS passed by the Oregon legislature in 
2013, which led to the challenges in Moro. v. State. Part III analyzes 
the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Moro v. State, particularly in 
relation to the expansion of the protections of the U.S. and Oregon 
Constitutions’s contract clauses. Lastly, without advocating for any 
particular changes, Part IV highlights the political realities and limited 
options that remain for the Oregon legislature to bend the rising cost 
curve of PERS. 
I 
BACKGROUND LAW 
A. Development of PERS 
The Oregon Public Employee Retirement System (PERS) has been 
around for more than sixty years.8 Prior to the establishment of PERS, 
several different sectors of public employees, including firemen, 
police officers, and teachers, had their own separate pension systems.9 
The Oregon legislature established a pension program for all 
 
6 Paris Achen, Brown, Pierce and Independent Thomason Spar on Taxes, Affordable 
Housing, Economy, PORTLAND TRIB. (Oct. 6, 2016), https://portlandtribune.com/pt/9         
-news/326387-206075-independent-joins-brown-pierce-in-gubernatorial-debate. 
7 Moro v. State, 357 Or. 167, 351 P.3d 1 (2015). 
8 OR. PUB. EMPS. RET. SYS., THE OREGON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
HISTORY THE FIRST 60 YEARS 7 (2010), https://www.nasra.org/files/State-Specific 
/Oregon/History_1-11-2011.pdf [hereinafter PERS HISTORY]. 
9 Id. at 4. 
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Oregonians over age seventy in 1933, and at the federal level, Social 
Security was signed in to law in 1935.10 Both of these events, 
combined with discontent with existing pension systems, provided 
momentum for a unified pension system for public employees.11 
The original PERS program was created during the 1945 legislative 
session and became effective on July 1, 1946.12 PERS functioned for 
nearly a decade before it became evident that the existing program 
was not meeting the needs of retirees.13 From 1939 to 1952, the 
average cost of living doubled,14 while PERS benefits stayed flat, 
primarily because the state only matched pension payments on the 
first $3000 of an employee’s salary.15 The combination of a rising 
cost of living with flat PERS benefits further exacerbated the problem 
for retirees. Because of this discrepancy, changes to PERS were 
needed for retirees to maintain their purchasing power. 
Surprisingly, the federal government inadvertently helped provide 
the solution to this problem.16 In 1953, President Eisenhower 
announced an expansion of the Social Security System, namely the 
Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program.17 While some 
public employee union leaders advocated for abolishing PERS in 
favor of solely participating in OASI, this option likely would have 
only led to a marginal increase in benefits with the added risk of 
being subject to centralized decision making in Washington, D.C., 
rather than Salem.18 To address this, Governor McKay appointed a 
special committee to examine integrating OASI with PERS.19 The 
special committee found that integrating OASI with PERS would lead 
to the best outcome for state employees.20 OASI, however, was only 
available to state employees not covered under existing plans.21 So 
 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 4–6. 
12 Id. at 7. 
13 Id. at 9. 
14 Id. at 8. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. OASI is a separate program and trust fund under Social Security, though the two 
have largely merged in present day practical implementation. Old-Age & Survivors 
Insurance Trust Fund, SOC. SECURITY, https://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/describeoasi 
.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2017). 
18 PERS HISTORY, supra note 8, at 8–9. 
19 Id. at 8. 
20 Id. at 9. 
21 Id. 
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the legislature hatched a plan to repeal PERS as it existed under the 
Public Employee Retirement Act of 1945, enroll state employees 
under OASI, and reinstate PERS, substantially in the same form, 
under the Public Employee Retirement Act of 1953.22 This essentially 
allowed employees to benefit from both OASI and the new PERS 
program. 
PERS continued to undergo routine periodic adjustments over the 
next few decades. In 1967, a bill packaging several PERS changes 
was signed into law; the two most notable changes shifted PERS 
benefits to a “guaranteed pension” and allowed for a portion of PERS 
proceeds to be invested in stocks with oversight by the Oregon 
Investment Council (OIC).23 As a result of being able to invest in 
high risk, high reward stocks, the OIC sought to increase returns and 
chose to invest ten percent of PERS funds in common stock.24 
Further, the guaranteed pension reforms led to the tripling of many 
retirees’ checks.25 However, economic fluctuations changed the needs 
of employees as time went on. Because of stagnant wages, the Oregon 
legislature passed a 1967 bill package that allowed unions to negotiate 
with employers for employers to “pick up” the six percent pension 
contribution for which the employees were responsible.26 
Throughout the 1970s, public employee unions continued to 
advocate for increases in pension benefits and structural changes to 
PERS.27 A few key changes included: (1) changes to the pension 
formula increasing the average pension benefit; (2) addition of an 
annual cost of living adjustment, initially capped at 1.5% and later 
increased to 2%; (3) an allowance for employees to retire with full 
benefits at earlier ages depending upon the number of years of 
service; and (4) a 25% increase in pension benefits for retirees prior to 
1968.28 
The most notable change to PERS came in 1975. The stock market 
slump of 1973 and 1974 led to concern about continuing to invest 
 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 12. 
24 Id. at 13. 
25 Id. at 14. 
26 Id. at 36. Since passage of this bill, local unions have been very successful in 
negotiating for employers to provide the “6% pick up.” Seventy-two percent of employees 
in PERS now have their contribution covered by their employer. OR. PUB. EMP. RET. SYS., 
supra note 2, at 14. 
27 PERS HISTORY, supra note 8, at 14. 
28 Id. at 15. 
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PERS proceeds in the stock market.29 Though the market eventually 
turned north again in 1975, the legislature was under pressure to act to 
protect promised PERS benefits.30 Accordingly, the legislature passed 
a bill that guaranteed PERS beneficiaries at least a 5.5% annual return 
on their PERS accounts.31 This is largely where the present day 
problems began; the addition of this guaranteed return added 
significantly to the budget deficits that now exist. 
B. Significant Structural Changes to PERS in the 1990s 
During the 1990s, as a larger number of PERS employees began to 
retire, the required contributions from public agencies increased.32 As 
costs increased, PERS reforms were put forward in legislation, ballot 
initiatives, and various public task forces.33 One of the most 
substantial reform efforts was under Ballot Measure 8 in 1994. Ballot 
Measure 8 would have made three changes to PERS as it existed at 
the time: (1) prevented employers from paying for part or all of an 
employee’s required six percent contribution, (2) prevented 
employees from using accumulated sick leave to retire early, and (3) 
removed the guaranteed rate of return on PERS investments.34 
Measure 8 narrowly passed on the November 1994 ballot.35 However, 
Measure 8 was immediately challenged as unconstitutional for 
violating the contracts clause of the United States Constitution. All 
three provisions of Measure 8 were eventually struck down by the 
Oregon Supreme Court in Oregon State Police Officers’ Association 
v. State as unconstitutional because they eliminated contractual rights 
that were already earned.36 This ruling established key precedent for 
future challenges to PERS reforms regarding contractual rights. 
PERS also faced court mandated changes. Under Oregon statute, 
PERS benefits were tax-exempt.37 A similar state statute in Michigan 
was challenged, and the U.S. Supreme Court held in Davis v. 
Michigan Department of Treasury that treating state and federal 
 
29 See id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 21. 
33 Id. at 19. 
34 Id. at 20. 
35 Id. 
36 Or. State Police Officers’ Ass’n v. State, 323 Or. 356, 380–81, 918 P.2d 765, 779 
(1996). 
37 PERS HISTORY, supra note 8, at 20. 
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pensions different under state tax laws violated the intergovernmental 
tax immunity doctrine.38 Essentially, to be valid, the two types of 
benefits must be treated the same.39 Because Oregon taxed federal 
pension benefits but exempted PERS benefits,40 Oregon was required 
to either start taxing PERS benefits or exempt from taxes federal 
pension benefits. 
In response to the Davis ruling, the Oregon legislature eliminated 
the tax-exempt status for PERS benefits in 1991.41 Affected public 
employees immediately sued in Hughes v. State challenging the 
removal of tax-exempt status for PERS benefits, alleging that the 
changes violated the contract clause of the Oregon Constitution.42 
Hughes established two important precedential principles. Specific to 
taxation, Hughes held that the state either had to exempt PERS 
benefits from taxation or could provide additional financial benefits to 
offset the newly imposed taxes on PERS benefits.43 The Oregon 
legislature would eventually opt for the latter option.44 The legislature 
enacted tax offsets first in 1991, and later in 1995, which applied to 
retirees in Oregon and those who retired out of state.45 More broadly 
relevant to future PERS reforms, Hughes established that the Oregon 
legislature could make prospective changes to PERS benefits not yet 
earned by public employees but could not make retrospective changes 
to PERS benefits that were already earned.46 In combination, Oregon 
State Police Officers Association determined that retrospective 
changes violated the contracts clause of the U.S. Constitution,47 and 
Hughes added that retrospective changes violated the contracts clause 
of the Oregon Constitution.48 
 
38 Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817 (1989). 
39 Id. 
40 PERS HISTORY, supra note 8, at 20. 
41 Moro v. State, 357 Or. 167, 185–86, 351 P.3d 1, 15 (2015). 
42 Hughes v. State, 314 Or. 1, 5–7, 838 P.2d 1018, 1020–21 (1992). 
43 Id. at 30–31, 838 P.2d at 1035. 
44 Moro, 357 Or. at 188, 351 P.3d at 16. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 187–88, 351 P.3d at 16. 
47 Or. State Police Officers’ Ass’n v. State, 323 Or. 356, 361, 918 P.2d 765, 768 (1996). 
48 Hughes, 314 Or. at 30–31, 838 P.2d at 1035. 
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C. The Current Three Tier PERS System 
While ballot measures and court rulings dealt with specific portions 
of PERS, the legislature also took periodic action to make structural 
changes to PERS. The first structural reforms were passed in 1995, 
beginning for new employees starting January 1, 1996.49 Employees 
entering service after that date are said to be in Tier 2, whereas 
employees who entered service prior to that date are said to be in Tier 
1.50 The legislature passed further reforms in 2003, creating a third 
tier of retirees.51 The 2003 legislation created a new retirement 
program called the Oregon Public Service Retirement Plan, or 
OPSRP, which applies to employees hired after August 28, 2003.52 
Although OPSRP is technically a new retirement program, OPSRP, in 
practice, is just a new tier of PERS employees. 
The differences in the three tiers are best analyzed by looking at 
the two components of PERS, a defined benefit pension and a defined 
contribution annuity. Each tier of PERS member has some aspect of 
both a defined benefit pension and a defined contribution annuity.53 
Generally speaking, the defined contribution annuity is funded by the 
employee’s six percent contribution, which may actually be paid by 
the employer, and supplemented by employer contributions.54 This 
annuity is called a defined contribution plan because the employee’s 
contribution to the account is a fixed amount.55 The defined 
contribution annuity functions similarly to an individual retirement 
account (IRA) or 401(k) retirement plan.56 The six percent 
contribution is put into an individual account, which is invested to 
create additional returns.57 Some of the PERS tiers create a 
guaranteed percentage of return on investment, generally set at six 
 
49 Gretchen Stangier, Oregon PERS Part 3: A Historical Look into a Troubled Past, 
STANGIER WEALTH MGMT. (May 6, 2013), https://www.stangierwealthmanagement.com 
/blog/oregon-pers-part-3-a-historical-look-into-a-troubled-past.html. 
50 Id. 
51 Moro, 357 Or. at 182, 351 P.3d at 12. 
52 Id. at 178, 182, 351 P.3d at 10, 12. 
53 See id. 
54 Carol Samuels, Senior Vice President, Seattle-Northwest Sec. Corp. & Lance Colley, 
Chief Operations Officer, Roseburg Pub. Sch., Everything You Wanted to Know About 
PERS . . . but Were Too Afraid to Ask, Presentation at the Oregon Summer Board 
Conference 18 (July 14, 2012), https://www.osba.org/-/media/Files/Event-Materials/SBC 
/2012/Materials/PERS-pdf.pdf?la=en. 
55 Moro, 357 Or. at 176, 351 P.3d at 9. 
56 See Samuels & Colley, supra note 54, at 3. 
57 Moro, 357 Or. at 177, 351 P.3d at 12. 
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percent, rather than the actual market return on investment.58 Upon 
retirement, the total amount in the individual account is divided into 
annual payments that the employee receives for life.59 If the actual 
market return on investment is less than the guaranteed return, that 
shortfall is supplemented by the employer.60 Some tiers also add an 
annual cost of living adjustment (COLA) to the annuity,61 discussed 
in more detail below. 
In addition to the defined contribution annuity, some PERS retirees 
also receive a defined benefit pension.62 The pension is called 
“defined benefit” because the benefit is defined for when an employee 
retires but the employee’s contributions do not change. Rather the 
employer’s contributions are adjusted over time to properly pay for 
the defined benefit.63 The pension system is funded by government- 
employer’s contribution and investment income on those 
contributions.64 When investment returns do not match expectations 
by the PERS board, the board can either reduce or increase an 
employer’s contribution rates.65 This Board-mandated adjustment can 
lead to spikes in employer contribution rates during economic 
downturns or market crashes, like in 2008.66 
The PERS defined benefit pension is calculated using one of three 
formulas: Full Formula, Money Match, or Pension Plus Annuity.67 
These formulas involve complex calculations but generally include as 
factors, among other things, the number of years of service and final 
average salary of the employee.68 In addition to these formulas, the 
pension amount can be influenced by a COLA and, as discussed 
above, an income tax offset.69 
Tier 1 retirees enjoy of number of superior benefits. First, Tier 1 
retirees enjoy a guaranteed rate of return on their defined contribution 
 
58 See id. at 176–81, 351 P.3d at 10–12. 
59 See id. 
60 Id. at 177, 351 P.3d at 10. 
61 Id. at 179, 351 P.3d at 11. 
62 Id. at 176, 351 P.3d at 9. 
63 Id. at 176, 351 P.3d at 10. 
64 Id. at 175–78, 351 P.3d at 9–10. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 82–83, 351 P.3d at 13. 
67 Id. at 179, 351 P.3d at 11. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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annuity, which has historically been eight percent.70 This benefit is 
particularly fruitful because it compounds year after year, with 
virtually no risk of decrease. Second, Tier 1 retirees can choose the 
highest net formula of the three formulas offered.71 Although the 
legislature intended the Full Formula to be the standard and most 
used, the Money Match formula proved to be the highest returning 
formula in recent years.72 Indeed, for some retirees, this lucrative 
formula has even led to some retirees receiving an annual income that 
is larger than their salary when they were working.73 Third, Tier 1 
retirees enjoy a high multiplier factor of 1.67% in calculating their 
Full Formula.74 Fourth, Tier 1 retirees enjoy being paid up to a 9.89% 
premium on their retirement benefits to cover state income taxes on 
their benefits.75 Fifth, Tier 1 retirees enjoy the lowest possible 
retirement age of all PERS retirees, with retirement eligibility at age 
fifty-eight.76 These perks make Tier 1 retirement benefits particularly 
generous when compared to the other PERS plans. 
The legislative changes enacted in 1995 to create PERS Tier 2 
retirees made a substantial impact to the unfunded liability that 
existed at the time. First, Tier 2 retirees do not have any guaranteed 
rate of return on their annuity contributions.77 Instead, they receive 
only true market investment rates.78 This change is particularly 
impactful because of the compounding effect mentioned above. 
Second, Tier 2 retirees are only allowed to choose the highest among 
two formulas in calculating their pension: Full Formula or Money 
Match.79 Removing the availability of the Pension Plus Annuity 
formula made a minimal impact because it was rarely the highest 
pension formula for a retiree. Third, as a specific result of the Hughes 
decision, the legislature removed the additional premium paid on 
 
70 Id. at 178, 351 P.3d at 10. The rate was reduced to 7.75% in 2013. Id. at 178 n.6, 351 
P.3d at 10 n.6. 
71 Samuels & Colley, supra note 54, at 3. 
72 Moro, 357 Or. at 180, 351 P.3d at 11. 
73 John Tyler, We’ll Continue to Pay for PERS’ Long Con, REG. GUARD, Sept. 18, 
2016, at H1 (showing over twenty percent of current retirees receive more in retirement 
than their last working salary); see Oregon Swallowed by PERS Costs, supra note 3. 
74 Comparison of Pension Programs, Presentation at the Oregon State University 
Faculty Senate (Mar. 2009), https://www.oregonstate.edu/senate/agen/2009/0903_Options 
.pdf. 
75 OR. PUB. EMPS. RET. SYS., supra note 2, at 3. 
76 Comparison of Pension Programs, supra note 74. 
77 Samuels & Colley, supra note 54, at 4. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
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PERS benefits to offset income taxes. Lastly, the retirement eligibility 
age was increased to age sixty for Tier 2 retirees.80 
Though the 1995 PERS reforms helped curb the growing costs of 
the retirement program, the dotcom bubble burst in the early 2000s 
and led to rising contribution rates from employers because of the 
losses in the stock market.81 As a result of these costs increases, the 
Oregon legislature passed the 2003 PERS reforms, creating the new 
Tier 3 of PERS employees, OPSRP.82 The OPSRP changes are 
significant because, in addition to creating a new class of retirees, 
those hired after August 28, 2003, OPSRP also stopped Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 employees from continuing to earn benefits under those 
programs.83 That is to say, current employees in 2003 kept any 
accrued benefits under Tier 1 and Tier 2, and those contributions 
already paid in to the system continued to accrue benefits according 
under those programs, but all retirement contributions after 2003 were 
now paid in to OPSRP, for all employees.84 This is certainly an 
accounting nightmare: someone who worked for the state from 2000 
to 2010 would have separate earned benefits under Tier 2 from 2000 
to 2003 and earned benefits under OPSRP from 2004 to 2010.85 
However, this change, with those discussed below, helped move 
PERS from being only sixty-five percent funded in 2003 to ninety-
eight percent funded in 2007.86 
In addition to moving all existing employees into the new OPSRP 
system, OPSRP reformed the defined contribution annuity into a new 
program called the Individual Account Program (IAP).87 Like the 
annuity program that preceded it, the IAP is similar to an individual 
retirement account because it is funded by the six percent employee 
contribution.88 However, unlike its predecessor, the IAP is not paid 
for life and is not subject to a COLA.89 Rather, the IAP annuity is 
 
80 OR. PUB. EMPS. RET. SYS., supra note 2, at 3. 
81 PERS HISTORY, supra note 8, at 23–24. 
82 See id. at 24–25. 
83 Moro v. State, 357 Or. 167, 179, 351 P.3d 1, 10–11 (2015). 
84 See id. 
85 See id. at 181, 351 P.3d at 12 (discussing how employees earn benefits in different 
tiers). 
86 Id. at 182–83, 351 P.3d at 13. 
87 What is the IAP, OREGON.GOV, https://www.oregon.gov/pers/MEM/Pages/What-is    
-the-IAP.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 2017). 
88 Id. 
89 Moro, 357 Or. at 181, 351 P.3d at 12. 
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solely based on the six percent employee contribution plus any 
investment income or losses.90 Because the annuity is only based on 
the funds deposited in the account, there is never a need for 
employers to supplement it.91 
OPSRP also made prospective changes to the defined benefit 
pension. Compared to Tier 2 retirees, OPSRP only offered one 
pension formula, the Full Formula.92 In addition to only offering this 
formula, OPSRP lowered the multiplier factor to 1.5% in calculating 
the Full Formula, down from 1.67% enjoyed by Tier 1 and Tier 2 
retirees.93 Lastly, OPSRP increased the full retirement age to either 
sixty-five years or age fifty-eight with thirty years of service.94 
The 2003 PERS reforms helped put PERS on a more sustainable 
path towards full funding. By 2007, PERS was ninety-eight percent 
funded.95 Indeed, in early 2007 (prior to the beginning of the 
recession), PERS was even recognized by PLANSPONSOR 
Magazine, a journal focused on public retirement systems, as the best 
funded public employee retirement system in the country.96 However, 
the recession was on the horizon. 
In 2008, PERS’s investments lost more than a quarter of their 
value.97 Just a year after determining that PERS was ninety-eight 
percent funded, the PERS board determined that PERS was only 
seventy-eight percent funded and had developed a $16.1 billion 
shortfall.98 To adjust for this shortfall, the PERS board had to raise 
contribution rates from employers.99 However, the PERS board only 
adjusts actuarial rates for employers once every two years,100 and the 
PERS board had just established contribution rates for the 2009–2011 
biennium immediately before the recession hit.101 This meant that the 
soonest that employer rates could be adjusted would have been in 
 
90 Id. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 Samuels & Colley, supra note 54, at 3. 
94 Comparison of Pension Programs, supra note 74. 
95 Moro, 357 Or. at 183, 351 P.3d at 13. 
96 Judy Ward, Public Plan Sponsor of the Year: The Oregon Trail, PLANSPONSOR 
(Feb. 2007), https://www.plansponsor.com/magazine/public-plan-sponsor-of-the-year-the  
-oregon-trail/. 
97 Moro, 357 Or. at 183, 351 P.3d at 13. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 177, 351 P.3d at 10. 
101 Id. at 183, 351 P.3d at 13. 
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2010 for the 2011–2013 biennium.102 This lag time in adjusted 
employer contributions meant that PERS fell even farther behind 
during the recession than other similarly impacted retirement plans. 
Further exacerbating the problem is the fact that there is a cap, 
called a “rate collar,” on how much employer contribution rates can 
be raised for any biennium.103 This cap was established to help 
prevent employers from seeing excessive spikes in contribution rates 
from year to year.104 From 1975 to 2005, employer contribution rates 
averaged between 9.15% and 11.4%.105 However, with the recession 
causing the PERS fund to lose twenty-seven percent of its value and 
with rate increases being delayed until 2010, a large rate increase was 
necessary to compensate for the losses that the fund suffered as a 
result of the stock market crash. As a result of the 2011–2013 rate 
increases, the system-wide contribution rate rose to the maximum 
allowable by the rate collar: 16.3%.106 However, even the 16.3% rate 
did not fully meet the actuarial needs of PERS.107 Thus, the employer 
contribution rates continued to increase in later years, despite more 
prosperous financial conditions. For the 2013–2015 biennium, the 
PERS board set the rate at 21.4%;108 however, this rate relied on the 
cost savings from the 2013 legislative changes. As discussed further 
below, with the legislative changes being struck down in Moro v. 
State, the unfunded liabilities of PERS continued to rise. Contribution 
rates for the 2017–2019 biennium are 20.85%, again lagging behind 
what is necessary to achieve full funding because they are limited by 
the rate collar.109 Contribution rates are expected to continue to rise in 





105 Id. at 183 n.11, 351 P.3d at 13 n.11. Current rates are difficult to precisely compare 
with historical rates because of a difference in accounting method that was implemented in 
2013. 
106 Id. at 183, 351 P.3d at 13. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Steven Patrick Rodeman, PERS Overview 13 (Mar. 6, 2017), https://olis.leg.state 
.or.us/liz/2017R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/103800. 
110 Id. at 16. 
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II 
CASE FACTS OF MORO V. STATE 
Realizing that changes to the program were necessary to both 
provide long-term sustainability and provide financial relief to public 
agency budgets, the Oregon legislature acted in 2013 by making 
substantive changes to PERS. 
Changes first came in the form of Senate Bill 822 (SB822). SB822 
made changes to the PERS COLA statute and tax offset statute. Prior 
to SB822, the COLA was added each year using the Portland 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), and it compounded from year to year.111 
The annual COLA is capped at 2%, and any CPI increase above 2% is 
banked, or reserved, for future years when the CPI is below 2%.112 
PERS members built up a fairly substantial COLA bank because, 
since 1972, the CPI has only been below 2% in seven years.113 SB822 
reduced the COLA cap from 2% to 1.5% and imposed a graduated 
cap, decreasing as total benefits increased, for retirement benefits in 
excess of $20,000, but the COLA was still based on the Portland CPI 
and could be banked.114 
Regarding the tax offset statute, SB822 removed the 1991 and 
1995 tax offset provisions from PERS members who were not subject 
to Oregon income taxes, which were primarily out-of-state retirees.115 
This change would have affected more than 16,000 retirees, which is 
about 14% of benefit recipients.116 In total, SB822 was predicted to 
reduce employer contribution rates from 21.1% to 18.6%, with 88% 
of those savings attributed to the COLA modifications.117 
However, concern remained that these reforms were not enough to 
save government agencies from having to make staffing cuts. To 
address these concerns, the legislature passed Senate Bill 861 
(SB861). SB861 was passed before the reforms in SB822 went into 
effect and further reformed the COLA modifications.118 Rather than 
changing how the cap functioned with a variable COLA tied to a CPI, 
SB861 changed the COLA to a graduated fixed rate. Under SB861, 
 
111 Moro, 357 Or. at 185, 351 P.3d at 14. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 186, 351 P.3d at 15. 
114 Id. The cap decreased as retirement benefits increased, with the minimum COLA of 
0.25% applying to benefits above $60,000. Id. 
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the first $60,000 in retirement benefits would receive a 1.25% annual 
COLA, and benefits above $60,000 would receive only a 0.15% 
annual COLA, which would dramatically reduce the growth of 
benefits for amounts over $60,000.119 Further, the transition from a 
variable COLA to a fixed COLA provided more certainty to the 
PERS Board and employer contributors in planning contribution rates 
for the future. 
To help soften the impact of the COLA reduction on low-income 
retirees, SB861 established two small supplemental payments, one 
mandatory and one discretionary.120 The first supplemental payment, 
which was mandatory, provided an additional 0.25% retirement 
benefit, up to $50, for those members who receive less than $20,000 
annually.121 The second supplemental payment, which was 
discretionary, allowed the PERS board to provide an additional 0.25% 
supplemental payment, not to exceed $150.122 This second 
supplemental payment was meant to be used during years of very 
high inflation. These supplemental payments were to be taken from 
contingency reserves, not from employer or employee 
contributions.123 
The additional changes under SB861 to the COLA, combined with 
those under SB822, roughly doubled the anticipated savings from the 
2013 reforms.124 Between SB822 and SB861, employer contribution 
rates were anticipated to be reduced by a total of 4.5%.125 Through 
2029, these changes would have represented system-wide savings of 
$5.3 billion dollars,126 a very significant amount. 
These bills were the result of months of negotiations spearheaded 
by then-Governor John Kitzhaber.127 Because of the amount of 
political capital invested in them and the significant impact they 
would have on bending the PERS cost curve, these bills were referred 
 





124 Id. at 190, 351 P.3d at 17. 
125 Id. This projected reduction did not incorporate the cost of the supplemental 
payments that were ultimately included in SB861. 
126 Id. at 191, 351 P.3d at 17. 
127 Lauren Drake, “Grand Bargain” Session Ends: Kitzhaber Proclaims Success in 
Reforming PERS, Funding Schools, BULLETIN (Oct. 3, 2013, 5:00 AM), https://www.bend 
bulletin.com/slideshows/1292327-151/grand-bargain-session-ends. 
GRIFFIN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2017  8:31 AM 
264 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96, 249 
to as the “grand bargain” of the 2013 legislative session.128 At the 
time, the PERS unfunded liability stood at around $14 billion, and 
these changes were expected to reduce that liability by up to one-
third.129 Because the changes in SB822 and SB861 applied to both 
benefits already earned and benefits that would be earned in the 
future, the changes were both retrospective and prospective.130 
SB822 and SB861 faced very strong opposition from current 
retirees, future retirees, and public employee unions.131 A group of 
plaintiffs representing long-time retirees, recent retirees, and future 
retirees, both in state and out of state, brought suit in state court 
challenging SB822 and SB861 as unconstitutional under the Oregon 
and United States Constitutions.132 The plaintiffs primarily argued 
that the changes to PERS violated the contract clauses,133 which 
prohibit “laws impairing the obligations of contracts.”134 In the 
alternative, the plaintiffs argued that the two bills were a breach of 
contract of their promised retirement benefits and were a takings 
without compensation under the Fifth Amendment.135 In passing 
these reforms, the Oregon legislature specifically granted the Oregon 
Supreme Court with original jurisdiction, so the case went directly to 
the Supreme Court and was argued on October 14, 2014.136 
III 
MORO V. STATE 
The plaintiffs sought to challenge SB822 and SB861 with four 
main arguments: (1) that the changes impaired their employment 
contracts and violated the contract clause of both the Oregon and U.S. 
Constitutions; (2) that the changes amounted to a breach of retirement 
benefits contracts and were an unconstitutional taking under both the 
Oregon and U.S. Constitutions; (3) that the changes violated the equal 




130 See Moro, 357 Or. at 232, 351 P.3d at 39–40.  
131 See Tyler Leeds, PERS Legal Battle Heats up: Oregon School Boards Association 
Works to Uphold Reform Bill in Legal Fight, BULLETIN (Aug. 16, 2013, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.bendbulletin.com/news/1343374-151/pers-legal-battle-heats-up. 
132 Id. 
133 Moro, 357 Or. at 192, 351 P.3d at 18. 
134 OR. CONST. art. I, § 21. 
135 Moro, 357 Or. at 192, 351 P.3d at 18. 
136 Id. at 167, 351 P.3d at 8. 
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Constitutions; and (4) that the changes violated federal statute, 4 
U.S.C. § 114, regarding taxation of pension income.137 While several 
alternate arguments were presented, both parties focused on the 
contract clause claim, which is how the court ultimately decided the 
case.138 In response to the contract clause claim, the defendants made 
two arguments: (1) that “the COLA and income tax offset are not 
contractual” and thus not subject to the contract clause; and (2) if the 
COLA and income tax offset are contractual, “that the amendments 
do not substantially impair the contract and are justified by a 
sufficient public purpose.”139 
The Oregon Constitution’s contract clause states that “no . . . law 
impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed . . . .”140 
This language largely matches the contract clause in the U.S. 
Constitution.141 Because the language closely mirrors the U.S. 
Constitution, Oregon precedent has followed the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the federal contract clause.142 Considering 
Supreme Court precedent, Oregon courts previously held that the 
protections of the contract clause are limited to retrospective, not 
prospective, impacts; that is, only contracts that are agreed to prior to 
the enactment of a limiting statute are protected by the contract 
clause.143 Thus, as it relates to SB822 and SB861, the court only 
considered “the potential impairment of contractual obligations 
arising only from contracts entered into before the effective date of 
the law being challenged.”144 As the court would later explain, the 
converse also holds true: changes to PERS affecting future 
employment contracts are not within the shelter of the contract clause. 
In considering violations of the contract clause, the court employed 
a four-step analysis that was used in prior Oregon cases: (1) is there a 
contract?; (2) if a contract exists, what are the exact terms of the 
contract?; (3) considering the terms of the contract, what obligations 
do those terms require on behalf of each party?; and (4) have actions 
of the state impaired the contract obligations of the parties?145 In 
 
137 Id. at 191–92, 351 P.3d at 18. 
138 See id. at 235–36, 351 P.3d at 41–42. 
139 Id. at 192, 351 P.3d at 18. 
140 OR. CONST. art. I, § 21. 
141 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
142 See Moro, 357 Or. at 192, 351 P.3d at 18. 
143 See id. at 231, 351 P.3d at 39. 
144 Id. at 194, 351 P.3d at 19 (emphasis added). 
145 See id. 
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deciding contract clause cases, rulings are generally made utilizing 
“general rules of contract law.”146 Particular to this case, because the 
State of Oregon was the allegedly violating party, the court also 
considered “the state’s role serving the public.”147 
The court must balance competing interests: in order to do 
business, parties have to know that the state will make good on its 
promises; however, state promises with unintended consequences, 
like PERS, can hinder current and new policy goals.148 Further, the 
Oregon Supreme Court has established a high bar that “disfavors 
interpreting statutes as contractual promises.”149 Statutes are 
generally only considered contractual promises “if the legislature has 
‘clearly and unmistakably’ expressed its intent to create a 
contract.”150 This interpretation is guided by the principle that a 
current legislature generally does not act in attempt to prevent a future 
legislature from changing existing policy. 
A. Do PERS Benefits Constitute a Contract? 
To determine if PERS represents a contract, and when precisely the 
contract was formed and in effect, the court applied prior Oregon 
precedent in combination with contract common law. Two prior 
cases, Strunk v. Public Employees Retirement Board151 and Hughes v. 
State,152 held PERS benefits to be contractually earned. Both parties 
in Moro v. State agreed that PERS benefits represented a contract, so 
this point was relatively undisputed. 
The court discussed common law contracts as applied to 
employment law. Employment contracts are generally unilateral 
contracts, with employers promising to compensate employees at a 
later date for services that are presently performed.153 Unilateral 
contracts are accepted via performance, which is not necessarily when 




148 See id. 
149 Id. at 195, 351 P.3d at 19; see Strunk v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 338 Or. 145, 171, 108 
P.3d 1058, 1075 (2005). 
150 Moro, 357 Or. at 195, 351 P.3d at 20 (quoting Campbell v. Aldrich, 159 Or. 208, 
214, 79 P.2d 257, 259 (1938)). 
151 Strunk, 338 Or. 145, 108 P.3d 1058. 
152 Hughes v. State, 314 Or. 1, 838 P.2d 1018 (1992). 
153 Moro, 357 Or. at 198–99, 351 P.3d at 21–22. 
154 See id. 
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variety of forms, including salaries, health insurance, vacation and 
retirement benefits, among other options.155 For example, PERS 
benefits are not delivered until an employee is in retirement, but they 
are earned when the employee renders his or her services.156 Because 
this case involved legislative changes to the PERS program, the court 
clarified that “the PERS statutes are themselves not an offer that 
employees can accept.”157 That is, changes to the PERS program are 
not de facto changes to the employee’s compensation contract. 
Because the PERS program is legislatively established and 
included as an offer by government employers, the contract is not 
formed when legislation is passed, but rather when an employee 
accepts an employer’s offer of employment for compensation.158 
Therefore, just like a paycheck, retirement benefits are being 
continuously offered along with employment by employers, and 
employees are continuously accepting that offer by rendering 
services.159 Because PERS benefits are considered compensation in a 
unilateral contract, the PERS contract likewise is formed when the 
employee’s services are rendered, and not when PERS legislation is 
passed or when they initially begin work for an employer.160 
B. What Are the Terms of the Contract? 
After establishing that PERS benefits are part of the employment 
contract, the court next considered the second step of the four-step 
analysis: defining the terms of the contract. In particular, the parties 
raised three contested issues relating to the terms of the contract: (1) 
what standard should a court use in identifying terms of the contract?; 
(2) were the 1991 and 1995 tax offset provisions terms of the 
contract?; and (3) were the COLA provisions terms of the 
contract?161 
In analyzing whether or not statutes create contractual promises, 
Oregon courts utilize the “unmistakability doctrine,” which “requires 
courts to interpret statutes as noncontractual unless the legislature’s 
 
155 See, e.g., id. at 198, 351 P.3d at 20. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 197, 351 P.3d at 21. 
158 Id. 
159 See id. at 198–99, 351 P.3d at 21–22. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 201–13, 351 P.3d at 23–29. 
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intent to bind the state is unmistakable.”162 Interestingly, the plaintiffs 
argued that the unmistakability doctrine only applies to the first step 
in the analysis—whether there is a contract—but does not apply to 
subsequent steps.163 The respondents argued that the unmistakability 
doctrine applies to both the first and second steps and went a step 
further arguing that only explicit language describing a statute as a 
contract can meet the unmistakability doctrine.164 Here, the court 
ruled that neither party properly interpreted precedent, particularly 
Hughes v. State, which refined the unmistakability doctrine.165 
Following Hughes v. State, the unmistakability doctrine clearly 
applies throughout the four-step contractual analysis; however, 
explicit language stating a statute creates a contractual right is not 
necessary to overcome the unmistakability doctrine.166 Rather, the 
unmistakability doctrine can be overcome with either explicit 
language or by looking at the broader implicit context of a particular 
provision of PERS.167 In applying the unmistakability doctrine, the 
court also considered two principles relevant to Moro v. State. First, 
because the PERS offer by definition includes “remunerative 
provisions,” or financial benefits, the offer can also “include 
provisions that define the eligibility for benefits or the scope of 
benefits.”168 Put another way, statutory provisions defining eligibility 
and calculation of retirement benefits can be part of the PERS 
contract because they determine the financial compensation in the 
contract. The court noted that the converse is also true: solely 
administrative aspects of implementation of PERS generally cannot 
be part of the PERS contract.169 Second, remunerative provisions are 
not by definition part of the PERS contract.170 Rather, remunerative 
provisions will be part of the PERS contract “only if it is mandatory, 
rather than optional or discretionary.”171 In considering the terms of 
the PERS contract, the court applied these two principles to the 1991 
and 1995 tax offset measures and COLA provisions. 
 
162 Id. at 202, 351 P.3d at 23. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 203–05, 351 P.3d at 24–25. 
166 Id. at 202, 351 P.3d at 24. 
167 Id. at 203, 351 P.3d at 24. 
168 Id at 204, 351 P.3d at 25. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 205, 351 P.3d at 25. 
171 Id. 
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While both the 1991 and 1995 tax offset provisions accomplished 
roughly the same purpose, the 1995 bill contains a unique provision. 
This provision explicitly states that “[n]o member of the system or 
beneficiary of a member of the system shall acquire a right, 
contractual or otherwise, to increased benefits.”172 Because of this 
provision, the 1995 tax offset clearly does not grant a contractual 
right, regardless of the high bar of the unmistakability provision.173 
The 1991 tax offset, however, contains no similar provision and is 
thus subject to the unmistakability doctrine. 
Under the unmistakability doctrine, the court found the 1991 tax 
offset to not be part of the PERS contract. The 1991 tax offset does 
contain mandatory wording for the calculation of benefits, making it 
eligible to be considered under the second principle of the 
unmistakability doctrine.174 However, the court reasoned that the 
1991 offset was not passed with the purpose of being an offer 
intended to increase the benefits for employees in exchange for 
services rendered.175 Rather, the 1991 offset was passed with the 
intent of serving as preemptive mitigation for a possible breach of 
contract case when the state began to tax state employee retirement 
benefits.176 Further evidence of this intent were the facts that the 
offset did not go in to effect until PERS benefits became taxable and 
that legislators sought advice from the Attorney General about 
whether it would suffice to mitigate damages from making PERS 
benefits taxable.177 
The plaintiffs further argued that even if the 1991 and 1995 offsets 
were not contractual terms of the PERS contract, the offset provisions 
were contractual terms of a 1997 settlement agreement that resolved a 
class action lawsuit, and the 2013 amendments should still be 
overturned.178 The court found that this argument failed for two 
reasons. First, the settlement agreement itself “contemplates future 
legislative action decreasing the benefits available under the tax 
offsets.”179 Second, and more importantly, the remedy for violation of 
 
172 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 238.362(3) (West 2017). 
173 Moro, 357 Or. at 205, 351 P.3d at 25. 




178 Id. at 208, 351 P.3d at 27. 
179 Id. 
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the settlement agreement is allowing for the reopening of the 
litigation, not overturning state statutes.180 For these reasons, the 
1991 tax offset did not meet the high threshold of the unmistakability 
doctrine and was held to not be a contractual provision of PERS.181 
The court also applied the unmistakability doctrine to the pre-
amendment COLA provisions to determine if they were a term of the 
PERS contract. The plaintiffs argued that changing the COLA to a flat 
rate and decreasing it as benefits increased was directly analogous to 
the COLA changes that were struck down by the Oregon Supreme 
Court in the 2005 Strunk v. Public Employees Retirement Board 
case.182 Because this case was very similar to Strunk, the respondents 
made three arguments to differentiate this case from Strunk: (1) that 
Strunk only held that requiring a COLA was a contractual term, and 
the court was free to independently analyze the COLA cap and COLA 
bank;183 (2) in the alternative, the court should overturn Strunk 
because it was inadequately considered and wrong at the time it was 
decided;184 and (3) that even if Strunk applies, it only protects the 
COLA provisions for Tier 1 and Tier 2 PERS members, not OPSRP 
members.185 
The court first discussed the scope of the legal challenge in Strunk. 
Strunk focused on a legislative amendment that prevented the PERS 
board from making COLA adjustments for certain retirees and 
changed the same pre-amendment COLA provisions at issue in this 
case.186 In Strunk, the court focused on the second principle of 
applying the unmistakability doctrine, that a provision must be 
mandatory in order for it to possibly be part of the terms of the PERS 
contract. In particular, the Strunk court emphasized the use of the 
word “shall”187 in mandating the PERS board to first determine the 
COLA, apply it to the retiree’s benefits, and cap and bank any amount 
 
180 Id. at 209, 351 P.3d at 27. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 210, 351 P.3d at 28. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 213, 351 P.3d at 29. 
185 Id. at 217, 351 P.3d at 32. 
186 Id. at 210–11, 351 P.3d at 28. 
187 Strunk v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 338 Or. 145, 219, 108 P.3d 1058, 1101 (2005). (“As 
soon as practicable after January 1 each year, [the board] shall determine the percentage 
increase or decrease in the cost of living . . . [T]he allowance . . . shall be multiplied by the 
percentage figure determined . . . [but] such increase or decrease shall not exceed two 
percent . . . .”) (emphasis added) (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 238.360 (2011)). 
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above two percent.188 Because of the mandatory nature of the text and 
a review of the legislative record, the Strunk court found that the 
legislature unmistakably evidenced its intent for the CPI-based COLA 
to be part of the PERS contract.189 
The respondents first argued for a narrow reading of Strunk as only 
finding that the underlying COLA tied to the CPI to be a term of the 
PERS contract and leaving this court free to independently analyze 
whether the COLA cap and bank were terms of the PERS contract.190 
In support of this argument, the respondents contended the COLA cap 
and bank were intended to provide more stability for employees, in 
contrast to the intent of the CPI-based COLA to compensate 
employees.191 Following this argument, because the COLA cap and 
bank were for the benefit of the employers, the legislature did not 
intend for them to be a term of the PERS contract, so the removal of 
them by SB822 and SB861 was allowable.192 However, because the 
COLA cap and bank intertwined function with the CPI-based COLA, 
the court quickly dismissed this argument.193 Because the three 
COLA provisions function together and Strunk found the CPI-based 
COLA to be a term of the PERS contract, the court found the COLA 
cap and bank to also be terms of the PERS contract.194 
In the alternative, the respondents argued for the court to overturn 
Strunk. In order for the court to do so, the respondents had to argue 
that Strunk “was inadequately considered or wrong when it was 
decided.”195 While the court acknowledged that “the analysis in 
Strunk is brief,” the court found it to be adequate, primarily because it 
relied on prior precedent in Hughes, which contained lengthy 
analysis.196 The court further reinforced the analysis in Strunk, 
holding the pre-amendment COLA to be a part of the PERS contract 
because it “set[s] out financial benefits, and . . . use[s] mandatory 
 
188 Moro, 357 Or. at 210–11, 351 P.3d at 28. 
189 Strunk, 338 Or. at 220, 108 P.3d at 1102. 
190 Moro, 357 Or. at 210–11, 351 P.3d at 28. 
191 See id. at 211–12, 351 P.3d at 28–29. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. (“[T]he COLA cap clearly determines the scope of the COLA requirement, and 
the COLA requirement was intended to benefit employees.”). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 213, 351 P.3d at 29 (quoting Farmers Ins. Co. of Or. v. Mowry, 350 Or. 686, 
693, 261 P.3d 1, 5 (2011)). 
196 Id. at 213, 351 P.3d at 29–30 (“The court’s heavy reliance on Hughes in Strunk does 
not mean that the court failed to adequately consider the issue.”). 
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wording.”197 Thus, the court found that Strunk adequately considered 
the question of whether the COLA is a term of the PERS contract.198 
The respondents also argued that Strunk was wrong at the time that 
it was decided. In support of this argument, the respondents pointed to 
the fact that when PERS was originally established in 1945, there was 
no COLA or other automatic adjustment for inflation, but the 
legislature did authorize a “dividend payment system” in 1963 to help 
account for inflation reducing purchasing power.199 These dividend 
payments were discretionary by the PERS board and were issued for 
only seven years, until the COLA was enacted in 1971.200 The 
respondents argued that because the dividend payments were 
discretionary and gratuitous, they were not part of the PERS contract, 
and that because the COLA just replaced the dividend payments, it 
was also not part of the PERS contract.201 This is similar to the 
arguments made by the State of Oregon in Strunk, and just as it failed 
in 2005, it failed in 2015. The court was not persuaded because (1) 
the COLA was mandatory whereas the dividend payments were 
discretionary, (2) the legislature wrote the COLA to apply to current 
and future PERS retirees whereas the dividend payments only applied 
to current retirees, and (3) the COLA was funded by current employer 
contributions whereas the dividend payments came from investment 
returns in excess of the assumed interest rate for a particular year.202 
Thus, the court refused to overturn Strunk on the grounds that it was 
either inadequately considered or wrongly decided that the COLA 
provisions were part of the PERS contract.203 
Lastly, the respondents argued that Strunk only determines that the 
COLA is a term of the PERS contract for Tier 1 and Tier 2 members, 
but not for OPSRP members because the OPSRP statute included a 
“reservation of rights” clause allowing the legislature to only 
prospectively change the OPSRP benefits that are “attributable to 
service performance and salary earned” and make both retrospective 
and prospective changes to benefits that are not attributable to 
service.204 The respondents contended that the COLA is not 
 
197 Id. at 213, 351 P.3d at 30. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 214, 351 P.3d at 30. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 215, 351 P.3d at 30–31. 
202 Id. at 215–16, 351 P.3d at 31. 
203 Id. at 217, 351 P.3d at 32. 
204 Id. at 218, 351 P.3d at 32. 
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attributable to service performance because it is attributable to the 
Portland CPI.205 The court rejected this argument for several reasons, 
primarily because the employee earns the right to PERS and the 
subsequent COLA benefits as a result of employment.206 Having 
found Strunk to be controlling precedent and rejected all of the 
respondents’ arguments, the court found the pre-amendment COLA 
provisions to be a term of the PERS contract.207 
C. Since the COLA Provisions Are a Term of the PERS Contract, 
What Obligations Does the PERS Contract Require? 
Having determined that the COLA provisions are terms of the 
PERS contract, the court next turned to what obligations those 
provisions impose. Because the tax offset provisions were determined 
to not be a term of the PERS contract, the court did not discuss them 
further. 
Regarding the COLA provisions, once the court determined that 
they are a term of the contract, the court also found that those benefits 
cannot be touched after they are earned.208 And because PERS 
benefits were deemed to be a unilateral contract, the benefits are 
earned when the employee performs the services, and those benefits 
are accrued on a regular basis.209 However, it was contemplated that 
because employers offered a set of benefits when an employee started 
working for a government entity, the employer was obligated to 
continue to offer the same set of benefits as long as the employee 
continued to work for the employer.210 
To answer this question, the court had to differentiate seemingly 
conflicting precedent. In Strunk, the court held that benefits not yet 
earned could be amended or revoked, so long as irrevocability was 
not an express term of the offer.211 Because PERS contained no such 
language regarding irrevocability, prospective changes, but not 
retrospective changes, were upheld.212 However, just prior to Strunk, 
the court held in Oregon State Police Officers’ Association v. State 
 
205 See id. 
206 Id. at 219, 351 P.3d at 33. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 See id. 
210 See id. at 221, 351 P.3d at 33–34. 
211 See Strunk v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 338 Or. 145, 193, 108 P.3d 1058, 1087 (2005). 
212 See id. 
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(OSPOA)213 that irrevocability need not be explicit, but rather could 
be an implicit term of an offer.214 In OSPOA, the court held that an 
employee’s right to retirement benefits, including PERS, vest when 
work is performed “but also [for] work that has not yet begun.”215 
And this vesting was held to encompass an implicit right to continue 
earning that same benefit so long as the employee remained under the 
employment of the same government agency.216 The court in Strunk 
distanced itself from the OSPOA holding, limiting it to only the 
specific statute in question in that case, but the court in Moro 
completely disavowed the OSPOA reasoning and instead applied the 
“explicit irrevocability test” from Strunk.217 Applying this test, the 
court found no language in PERS, or specific to the COLA 
provisions, that expressly made irrevocability a component of the 
offer or contract.218 Thus, the obligations under the COLA provisions 
of the PERS contract require employers to pay the employee for 
PERS benefits earned for work to date, but allow the employer to 
make prospective changes for future benefits not yet earned.219 
D. Has the State Impaired Any Required Obligations of the PERS 
Contract? 
Having established that the COLA provisions are terms of the 
PERS contract and those terms prevent the retroactive change to 
PERS benefits, the court found that SB822 and SB861 impaired the 
obligations of the PERS contract because they made retroactive 
changes.220 As a final effort, the respondents made three arguments 
that allow for impairment of contracts: (1) that the COLA changes 
may not necessarily result in reduced benefits for all PERS members; 
(2) that even if the COLA change does impair the PERS contract, 
they are not “substantial” impairments; and (3) that the COLA 
changes are “justified as reasonable and necessary for an important 
public purpose.”221 
 
213 Or. State Police Officers’ Ass’n v. State, 323 Or. 356, 918 P.2d 765 (1996). 
214 See id. at 371, 918 P.2d at 773. 
215 See id. 
216 See id. 
217 Moro v. State, 357 Or. 167, 224–27, 351 P.3d 1, 36–37 (2015). 
218 Id. 
219 See id. 
220 Id. at 227–28, 351 P.3d at 37. 
221 Id. at 228, 351 P.3d at 37–38. 
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Because of the uniqueness of the litigation, the court appointed a 
special master to serve as factfinder prior to briefing on the legal 
arguments.222 Respondents argued that under certain economic 
conditions, the fixed COLA at 1.25% could exceed the Portland CPI 
that the pre-amendment COLA is linked to and lead to a net benefit 
for employees.223 However, the court quickly rejected this because of 
the economic assumption of normal economic growth included in the 
record prepared by the special master.224 
Next, the court considered how “substantial” of an impairment the 
COLA changes would create.225 Pointing to the power of compound 
interest, the court considered that “[w]ith annual compounding, by the 
tenth year of retirement, the COLA can make up about 20% of the 
retirement benefit . . . [a]nd by the fourteenth year of retirement, 
under the same conditions, the COLA can make up about 30% of the 
retirement.”226 The fact that the COLA grows to become such a large 
portion of the annual retirement benefit led the court to conclude that 
these changes would meet a substantial impairment threshold.227 
Lastly, the respondents sought to import the federal “public 
purpose defense” into the application of the state contract clause.228 
Under the public purpose defense, impairment is allowed when (1) a 
contract “would require the state to ‘surrender[ ] an essential attribute 
of its sovereignty,’” or (2) “impairment is ‘reasonable and necessary 
to serve an important public purpose.’”229 The court quickly 
dismissed the first argument because fulfilling a financial obligation 
to public employees is a commonplace contract that does not 
implicate state sovereignty.230 The court further considered whether 
or not the COLA amendments were necessary for an important public 
purpose, but found the respondents’ arguments still failed.231 
Following federal precedent, this is a balancing test with the “scales 
 
222 Id. at 174, 351 P.3d at 8. 
223 Id. at 226–27, 351 P.3d at 37. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. at 228, 351 P.3d at 37–38. 
226 Id. at 228, 351 P.3d at 38. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 229, 351 P.3d at 38 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. 
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23, 25 (1977)). 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
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weighed against allowing the state to impair its own contractual 
obligations,” with consideration of alternatives being a large factor.232 
Here, importantly, the court found that the state failed to consider 
alternatives of reducing other parts of the budget in order to increase 
funding for public safety and education, the stated goal of making 
PERS reforms.233 That is, the state would have to show that “current 
level[s] of funding [are] so inadequate as to justify allowing the state 
to avoid its own financial obligations.”234 The court found that the 
state failed to meet that threshold.235 While the state did argue that it 
has a limited ability to raise tax revenue while still remaining 
economically competitive with other states, the court did not find this 
persuasive because Oregon was below the national average in several 
tax indicators.236 
Having concluded that the COLA provisions are part of the PERS 
contract and that SB822 and SB861 would interfere with that 
contract, the court struck down those provisions, while upholding the 
changes to the tax offset provisions.237 
IV 
AFTER MORO, IS REFORM POSSIBLE? 
Three main barriers stand in the way of meaningful reforms.238 
First, after the ruling in Moro v. State, there are limited options that 
the Oregon legislature can enact that would pass constitutional muster 
and make a meaningful difference to bend the cost curve. To prevent 
substantial increases in employer contributions over the coming years, 
changes need to be made not only for existing employees, but also for 
all new hires, putting them potentially into their own new system, a 
fourth tier. 
Second, while there are still some limited reform possibilities left 
for current employees, Oregon politicians will likely choose to fill 
budget shortfalls through other means, as changes to PERS would 
continue to face fervent opposition from public employee labor 
 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 230–31, 351 P.3d at 39. 
234 Id. at 230, 351 P.3d at 39. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 234–35, 351 P.3d at 41. 
238 To again be explicit, this piece does not aim to advocate for any particular changes 
to PERS. Rather, this piece explores what reforms remain legally possible following the 
ruling in Moro v. State. 
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unions. Rather than addressing PERS as a spending problem, 
pursuing tax increases is much more politically palatable in Oregon. 
Third, with limited legislative options and political will lacking, 
only a shift in the law would allow changes like SB822 and SB861 to 
be upheld. With judges being elected in Oregon and labor unions 
being so politically active, however, this seems unlikely to happen. 
Because of this, PERS is likely here to stay, and it will continue to 
become a larger and larger share of Oregon’s biannual budget. 
A. Limited Options Moving Forward 
In striking down SB822 and SB861, the Oregon Supreme Court 
has once again reiterated that PERS reforms not only face a political 
uphill battle in the legislature, but also an uphill judicial battle. While 
Moro v. State struck down the COLA amendments, which promised 
to provide the majority of the financial savings for the state, the court 
did provide some budgetary relief for the state by upholding the 
amendments to the tax offset provisions. 
Few options remain for the state legislature to realize cost savings 
from the PERS program. First, PERS changes that are prospective are 
clearly constitutional. However, those changes would not address Tier 
1 and Tier 2 employees, who are the primary cost drivers of PERS. 
Second, although the court did not specifically endorse the 
“substantial impairment” requirement for violating the contract 
clause, changes to PERS that did not “substantially impair” the PERS 
contract could potentially be upheld. Third, while the court found that 
SB822 and SB861 did not meet the “public purpose test” for violating 
contractual obligations, if funding for public programs were 
dramatically in peril, future changes to PERS could potentially be 
upheld under the “public purpose test.” Lastly, looking forward, if the 
legislature does seek to make any changes to PERS in the future, the 
legislature must be explicit that they do not intend to create a 
contractual right for employees, if that is in fact not their intent. 
After Moro v. State, the only set of PERS reforms that will clearly 
not run afoul of the contract clause are prospective changes. Because 
PERS has been deemed a unilateral contract, employees do not accept 
the contract until performing the services. Because the benefits are 
not earned until an employee performs the services, the legislature is 
still free to make changes to future benefits that will be earned by 
current and future employees. These changes would likely be upheld 
for both current and new employees. Just as PERS has seen structural 
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changes to the benefits it offers resulting in Tier 1, Tier 2, and OPSRP 
members, the legislature could choose to create a new tier of PERS 
members with benefits further trimmed from the existing OPSRP 
plan. However, because of the guaranteed rate of return, Tier 1 
employees, whose previously earned benefits are untouchable by 
prospective changes, continue to be the biggest cost drivers in the 
broader PERS system239 and their benefits earned to date are off 
limits. 
If the State did attempt to make retrospective changes to the 
benefits already earned by these members, there is a possibility that 
small changes would not exceed the “substantial” impairment 
threshold in the fourth step of analyzing contract clause cases. 
Although the court declined in both Strunk and Moro to specifically 
announce that contract impairments must be substantial in order to 
violate the contract clause, the court discussed the substantial 
threshold in both cases. However, it remains an open question 
whether or not the court would apply the threshold in the future, and 
if it did, what an unsubstantial impairment would look like. The court 
spent little time defining “substantial,” and focused its analysis on 
how much of a financial impact SB822 and SB861 would have on 
PERS retirees. However, any PERS reforms that would provide 
sought-after cost savings would likely be substantial, whereas 
unsubstantial changes would likely not meet the goal of providing 
cost savings. 
In the 2017 Legislative Session, Oregon faced a $1.8 billion dollar 
shortfall, but Oregonians continue to show a reluctance to raise taxes, 
evidenced by the failure of Measure 97 in November 2016. Because 
of this, Oregonians are likely to see a reduction in state services over 
the coming years. While the court rejected that the SB822 and SB861 
were “‘reasonable and necessary to serve an important public 
purpose,’”240 the legislature could argue that future PERS reforms 
meet this threshold. However, this would seem to be very difficult to 
meet. As the court described, meeting the public purpose test would 
require for the “current level of funding [to be] so inadequate as to 
justify allowing the state to avoid its own financial obligations.”241 
 
239 ECONORTHWEST, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT IN OREGON: WHERE DOES THE 
SYSTEM STAND AND WHERE COULD OREGON GO FROM HERE? 4–3 (Aug. 31, 2007), 
https://chalkboardproject.org/sites/default/files/public-employee-retirement-in-oregon.pdf. 
240 Moro, 357 Or. at 229, 351 P.3d at 38 (quoting U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 
431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977)). 
241 Id. at 230, 351 P.3d at 39. 
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This implies that the state budget would have to be in extremely dire 
straits. Further, the public purpose test requires that a government 
consider and eliminate other alternatives of achieving the same goal. 
If the state’s budget were to reach this extreme level of inadequacy, 
the public would likely be more willing to increase tax revenues, 
particularly on corporations, than voters currently are. Thus, like the 
“substantial impairment” threshold, it seems unlikely that the “public 
purpose test” is a viable option for upholding future PERS reforms. 
While few options remain for tackling the real cost drivers in the 
PERS program, one takeaway from Moro v. State is how to avoid 
contract clause implications in the future. While the court seemed to 
focus on the word “shall” as evidence of legislative intent for a 
provision to be part of the PERS contract, thus meeting the 
unmistakability doctrine, the legislature can make their intent clear in 
the future by including a section regarding contractual rights. For 
example, the court was able to quickly decide that the 1995 tax offset 
was not part of the PERS contract because of Section 2 stating “[n]o 
member of the system or beneficiary of a member of the system shall 
acquire a right, contractual or otherwise, to the increased benefits 
provided” by those provisions.242 Thus, as the legislature considers 
making any prospective changes to PERS, creating a near tier of 
PERS, or reforming any other benefits, the legislature should be clear 
about their intent to create, or not to create, a contractual right. 
B. Politics Hampers Few Remaining Reform Options 
Assuming the Oregon legislature did choose to pursue one or 
several of the possible remaining reforms, political will is likely 
lacking both from the Governor’s office and the legislature to see 
changes through to completion. 
When the “Grand Bargain” was passed in 2013, Governor 
Kitzhaber was the driving force behind development of the legislative 
package and its eventual passage. Fast-forward to 2017, where 
Governor Brown has made numerous statements that she only hears 
“lawsuits” when PERS reform is discussed,243 and the issue is 
noticeably lacking when Governor Brown discusses her priorities for 
the 2017 Legislative Session and beyond. Given her political base, 
Governor Brown seems unlikely to change her mind on PERS reform. 
 
242 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 238.362(3) (West 2017). 
243 Achen, supra note 6. 
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Without strong leadership from the Governor’s office on PERS 
reform, the leadership is left to come from the Oregon legislature. 
While legislative leaders in the senate have formed a bipartisan 
workgroup that has put forth reform ideas in discussion drafts, these 
drafts have yet to receive much support. Oregon as a state has 
historically favored the Democratic Party and will continue to do so 
without major political shifts. Without support from the Democratic 
Party, reforms to PERS are unlikely to succeed. A large constituency 
of the Democratic Party is public employee unions, who often oppose 
PERS reforms. Democratic legislators have little incentive to push for 
PERS reforms because of opposition from their political base. Thus, 
the political incentives remain stacked against PERS reform. 
C. Without Shift in the Law, PERS Reforms Are Unlikely 
One last avenue that could open additional options for PERS 
reforms could be a shift in the legal analysis currently employed for 
analyzing the constitutionality of changes to PERS, like that 
employed in Moro v. State. Pressing economic crises have shifted 
legal analyses in the past. For example, private economic rights were 
dramatically weakened during the early part of the twentieth 
century.244 This occurred for several reasons. First, the Great 
Depression served as a dramatic incentive for Congress to increase 
the involvement of the federal government in economic matters. 
Second, legislative programs, like that in the New Deal, that were 
earlier thought to have clearly violated the commerce clause, were 
passed and helped the country recover from the Great Depression. 
Third, President Roosevelt appointed several new Supreme Court 
justices and threatened to appoint more who would be more open to 
this kind of government growth.245 These events led to a dramatic 
shift in Supreme Court analysis of economic rights and a growth of 
the commerce clause. 
One could argue that Oregon has its own perfect storm of factors 
that could lead to a shift in the legal analysis of PERS reforms. First, 
Oregon voters have refused to pass sales tax measures or other 
revenue increases, most recently including Measure 97 in November 
 
244 See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. 
REV. 527, 535–36 (2015) (claiming that the Supreme Court “would no longer protect 
unenumerated economic rights”). 
245 Id. at 539. 
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2016.246 Second, despite various initiatives and increases in funding 
for education over the last decade, Oregon continues to rank in the 
bottom five states in the country in numerous educational metrics, 
including high school graduation rate.247 Third, in terms of future 
composition, the composition of justices on the Oregon Supreme 
Court will likely shift to newer justices who are less likely to be 
PERS Tier 1 beneficiaries. 
While these circumstances exist, a shift in the legal analysis for 
PERS seems unlikely to occur, at least in the near term. First, while 
judges are generally regarded as impartial administrators of justice, 
Oregon judges are elected to their terms, rather than serving for life as 
federal judges do.248 Oregon judges that appear likely to uphold 
PERS reforms would likely face the wrath of public employee unions 
in future elections. Second, while voters have repeatedly rejected new 
revenue proposals, the Oregon Supreme Court is likely to continue to 
view an increase in taxes as a release valve to solve budgetary woes 
before they get more involved by utilizing the “substantial 
impairment” or “public purpose test” discussed in Moro v. State. 
Third, while the composition of judges of the Supreme Court may 
change and not be PERS Tier 1 employees, this factor is unlikely to 
lead to new judges being willing to move so blatantly afar from stare 
decisis and prior precedent. For these reasons, a shift in the analytical 
structure for future PERS reforms seems unlikely. 
CONCLUSION 
PERS will continue to be a hotly debated topic in Oregon because 
of the budget implications and politics surrounding public employee 
compensation. While many had hoped that SB822 and SB861 would 
help to control cost growths and leave more of the state budget for 
public services like education, Moro v. State struck down the PERS 
COLA amendments, one of the biggest cost savers, while upholding 
the removal of tax offset provisions, which is providing little 
 
246 Hillary Borrud, Oregon Corporate Tax Measure 97 Defeated: Election 2016 
Results, OREGONIAN (Nov. 8, 2016, 10:00 PM), https://www.oregonlive.com/politics 
/index.ssf/2016/11/oregon_corporate_tax_measure_9.html. 
247 Betsy Hammond, Oregon’s Graduation Rate, Among Worst in Nation, Inches up 1 
Percent, OREGONIAN (Jan. 26, 2017, 7:57 AM), https://www.oregonlive.com/education 
/index.ssf/2017/01/oregons_graduation_rate_among.html. 
248 Judicial Selection in the States: Oregon, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 
https://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=OR (last visited Sept. 
28, 2017). 
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budgetary relief. More broadly, this case means that the legislature’s 
hands are largely tied for benefits already earned by employees, 
particularly Tier 1 employees, whose benefits are the largest cost 
drivers in PERS. This leaves only prospective changes as viable 
options for PERS reforms, which are unlikely to be passed. Thus, 
PERS reforms are unlikely, but the discussion about how we cover 
the budgetary shortfalls caused by PERS will surely continue as 
PERS continues to swallow a growing share of the state budget. 
 
